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THE ETHICAL BASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BY: SCOTT FITzGIBBON'
INTRODUCTION
I The General Project.
Human rights have become the grounding of human solidarity. They
are, today, the substance of the brotherhood of man. They take the place
once occupied by "our common clay," our common ancestry, and our
common relationship with the Deity.
This being the case, it is important to understand what, in turn, grounds
human rights. There is nothing approaching a consensus: indeed, the
impressive edifice on which much of the political order of the world now
rests has been constructed based on the conscious decision by its principal
authors to prescind from asking this basic question. Unsurprisingly under
these circumstances, more and more rights are being proposed,2 and many
divergent theories are propounded as to their bases.3
1. J.D., Harvard. B.C.L., Oxford. Professor, Boston College Law School. Member of
the Massachusetts bar. My thanks to James Gordley, W.R. Irby Chair in Law, Tulane
University School of Law, for his comments, which extended through several drafts and
were a great help, and to those scholars who attended a session relating to this paper at
Trinity College, Dublin in the Autumn of 2017, especially Head of School Oran Doyle;
their comments were numerous and very thoughtful.
2. Four examples among many: The International Covenant on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination includes a "right to inherit." International Covenant on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. V(d)(iv), March 7 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195. The African Charter includes a right to "security." The African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights art. 23.1, Oct. 21, 1986 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. The International,
Covenant on the Rights of the Child identifies a right for a child to be "cared for" by his
parents. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights identifies "the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health." International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12 § 1, Dec.
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). See THANA CHRISTINA DE
CAMPOS, THE GLOBAL HEALTH CRISIS: ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES 28
(20 17)(hereinafter referred to as "de Campos, Global Health") and works cited.
3. An extensive bibliography of works on human rights is available in the "Human
Rights" entry in the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/. Many of the works cited below also set
forth extensive lists of authorities.
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This Essay considers four proposed bases and rejects them. It proposes
an account according to which the ethical basis for human rights is the
protection of fundamental human attributes. 4
II. Some Carve Outs.
This Essay does not propose that all human rights be recognized by
positive law. Plainly the extent of their recognition may depend on
considerations special to the legal system and social order in question. Nor
does this Essay aim to determine what, if anything, has been achieved by
way of common understanding in international instruments and national
law. (Scholars often find common understanding to be in short supply.).
Doubtless a common understanding would be most helpful; agreement is
central to the noble endeavor of protecting people from many horrific
practices. Even muddled pseudo-agreement may be better than none at all.
But discerning or promoting such an agreement is not the purpose here.
Instead, this Essay pursues the thoroughly normative project of asking
what deserves protection as a human right, largely presiding from the
question of whether governments and lawyers see things that way. One
seeks to understand such objective realia out of love of knowledge and
respect for the truth. One hopes to develop a basis for refuting "human
rights nihilism." One aspires to facilitate clarity, and thus to dispel fog and
deprive violators of concealment. If the foundational goods prove to be the
stuff of ordinary life, as here proposed, then human rights can be focused
on them and therefore be better integrated into the moral and social orders
of many countries,5 rather than becoming the "playthings of bureaucrats"
and the vehicles for the promotion of novel and meretricious practices.
4. Thus this Article has a close affinity with "personalism," a philosophy which is
extensively discussed in THOMAS D. WILLIAMS, WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR?
PERSONALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005)(hereinafter
referred to as "Williams, Who Is My Neighbor?"). Endorsing a personalist theory must
lead on to an exploration of the basic characteristics and actions of the person. Regrettably,
those subjects are mostly left unconsidered in Williams' book. They are considered here.
5. See generally Paulo G. Carozza, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of
Human Rights: A Reply, 19 EUROPEAN J. INT'L. L. 931, 941-42 (2008),
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/19/5/1704.pdf. This article observes that human rights are based:
"on a very thin, if any, agreement about where they come from and what they mean. * * *
To compensate for this precarious state, human rights lawyers and political actors have
spent decades dedicating themselves to the building up of the positive law of international
human rights - multiple treaties, institutions, and processes designed to 'translate' the
underlying principles into hard norms with widespread global acceptance. Once
'constitutionalized' in this way, the validity of the norms can become conceptually
distanced from their social or philosophical basis, like Hart's Rule of Recognition or
Kelsen's Grundnorm, thus obviating (or at least obscuring) the need (and perhaps even the
possibility) to inquire into, or shore up, their originally pluralistic ethical starting points. *
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This Essay does not even maintain that the answers it proposes are the
entire story. Only "fundamental goods" and "indispensable goods" are
here emphasized. There are others, not here much discussed. Furthermore,
this Essay leaves aside many related questions, such as whether each
person has the same rights to the same degree, what to do when rights
conflict, and when rights can properly be waived or forfeited by
misconduct or overridden owing to cost or exigency.6 Further still, this
Essay refrains from addressing the subject of what duties a right generates:
notably, the questions of when a right has the effect of immunizing the
holder from interference and when a right requires others to assist.7 All of
this permits this Essay to pursue without distraction its principal mission:
crafting an account of the principal ethical bases of human rights.
III. The Two Big Questions.
There are two major issues about human rights. The first is: what
goods are worthy of any sort of protection, individual, social or legal? The
second issue is what characteristics make a good suitable for human rights
protection, as opposed to protection of some other sort.
This Essay addresses the first issue in Part One. It is there proposed
that the most important goods relate to the nature of the person. A general
statement of the thesis is: if you could not be fully a person without
something -- your life, for example, or your mind - that thing is a part of
fundamental good. If you could not be fully a person without doing
something - thinking, for example - that activity would seem to be a part
of fundamental good. Perhaps we could add: if you would be drastically
different if deprived of something (your memory, for example) or
prevented from ever again engaging in some project (remembering things,
for example), you deserve protection from being permanently deprived of
that thing or permanently thwarted in performing that project.
* * The law which is constructed without attentiveness to the underlying cultural context
tends toward abstraction which separates it from the society that it purports to regulate. *
* * [T]he vacuum existing between the positive law of international human rights and the
meaning-generative contexts in which people actually live their lives tends to get filled
with an exaggerated role of bureaucratic institutions and political elites."
6. Further, this Essay eschews the project of describing the motives which might lead
people to respect human rights. (That topic is taken up in Michael J. Perry, Human Rights
Theory, 2: What Reason Do We Have, ifAny, to Take Human Rights Seriously? Beyond
"Human Dignity" 23 (Emory U. Sch. of L. Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 15-350),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2597404 (proposing that the
fundamental answer to this question is "the agapic sensibility")).
7. An exploration of the literature is set forth in de Campos Global Health, supra n.
2, at 67 et seq.
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Plainly, this thesis opens out into an inquiry as to the especially
important attributes and projects of a person. This paper pursues that
inquiry. Reason, reasoning, and knowledge are proposed as central. This
brings the discussion into close touch with the classic tradition of ethical
anthropology.
The analysis in Part One is by far the most important part of this Essay,
and can stand on its own merits whatever the reader may think about the
more complicated material in Part Two.
The second issue is addressed in Part Two: what characteristics make
a good eligible for the especially strong protections demanded by human
rights? Answering this question is exigent, because any plausible good
which is identified as worthy of general protection must be a big one, and
a theory of human rights which introduced no limiting criteria would
therefore appear to extend its umbrella over vast ranges of practices. Part
Two of this Essay therefore identifies several principles which restrict the
scope of human rights.
IV Winston and Julia.
You remember the situation portrayed in George Orwell's novel
Nineteen Eighty-Four: an England subject to Big Brother, whose ever-
watching face was posted on all walls; an England where the population
was fearful of a large and all-powerful "Party," and was constantly under
observation through Televisors in every comer. You remember Julia and
Winston: their loathing of the regime; their secret love of one another; their
rendezvous in a hidden room behind a bookstore; and their terrible
vulnerability.
You remember that they were detected, captured, and separately
interrogated. You remember Winston's intolerable, interminable ordeal of
days or weeks, and his final capitulation:
"The circle of the mask was large enough now to shut out the vision
of
anything else. The wire door was a couple of hand-spans from his face.
The rats knew what was coming now. One of them was leaping up and
down, the other, an old scaly grandfather of the sewers, stood up, with his
pink hands against the bars, and fiercely sniffed the air. Winston could see
the whiskers and the yellow teeth. Again the black panic took hold of him.
He was blind, helpless, and mindless. * * *
"The mask was closing on his face. The wire brushed his cheek. And
then -- no, it was not relief, only hope, a tiny fragment of hope. Too late,
perhaps too late. But he had suddenly understood that in the whole world
there was just ONE person to whom he could transfer his punishment --
[Vol. 19
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ONE body that he could thrust between himself and the rats. And he was
shouting frantically, over and over.
'Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia! Not me! Julia! I don't care what you do
to her. Tear her face off, strip her to the bones. Not me! Julia! Not
me! '
You probably remember the consequences for Julia's and Winston's
love for one another:
"They sat down on two iron chairs, side by side but not too close
together. He saw that she was about to speak. She moved her clumsy shoe
a few centimeters and deliberately crushed a twig. Her feet seemed to have
grown broader, he noticed.
"'I betrayed you,' she said baldly.
"'I betrayed you,' he said.
"She gave him another quick look of dislike.
'Sometimes,' she said, 'they threaten you with something --
something you can't stand up to, can't even think about. And then you say,
'Don't do it to me, do it to somebody else, do it to so-and-so.' And perhaps
you might pretend, afterwards, that it was only a trick and that you just
said it to make them stop and didn't really mean it. But that isn't true. At
the time when it happens you do mean it. You think there's no other way
of saving yourself, and you're quite ready to save yourself that way. You
WANT it to happen to the other person. You don't give a damn what they
suffer. All you care about is yourself.'
'All you care about is yourself,' he echoed.
'And after that, you don't feel the same towards the other person any
longer.'
'No,' he said, 'you don't feel the same.-'
9
You certainly remember the very last sentences of the book:
"[Winston] gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken
him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache.
O cruel, needless misunderstanding! 0 stubborn, self-willed exile from the
loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose.
But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished.
He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother."'"
You can see, I am sure, that Winston's and Julia's human rights were
terribly violated. This Essay seeks to establish the theoretical basis for this
conclusion.
8. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 361-62 (1949) (hereinafter referred to
as Orwell, 1984),.
9. Id. at 369.
10. Id. at 376. The preceding blank line does not appear in the published version.
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PART ONE
Human rights protect goods. No one would assert a right to sickness
or insanity. We may add: important goods; not mere desiderata. No one
thinks there is a human right to pleasant elevator music.
What then, are the important goods? This Part One aims to answer that
question." This Part is interspersed with indented paragraphs which
reflect on what the analysis, as it unfolds, may imply for human rights.
I set aside ethical skepticism. Surely there is some point to the things
we do and the situations we aim to establish, or why would we do them or
aim to bring them about. (Why else would you be reading this Essay?)
Surely there is some point to human rights, or why would we
recognize and respect them? 12
Some Types of Good.
Some things are good only instrumentally - in other words, for the
sake of something else. But things of that sort -- "instrumental goods" --
cannot be the entire story. There must be at least one good of another sort
something which is good not (only) for the sake of something else, but
is instead worth having or doing in itself Otherwise, what would
instrumental goods ultimately be good for?' 3 That other sort of good is
basic, and is emphasized in this Essay under the name "fundamental
11. Some of this section of the Essay is guided by and in part tracks the brilliant and
telling arguments presented in the Nicomachean Ethics.
12. But cf JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (3 d ed., 2013)(hereinafter referred to as Donnelly, Universal Human Rights)
at 19-21 (stating, at 21, that "[t]here are no strong foundations for human rights .... "),
13. Thus ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1094a 17-22 (W.D. Ross, trans.), in I1 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1729, 1729
(Jonathan Barnes, ed., 1984)(hereinafter referred to as Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics). :
"If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake
(everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for
the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our
desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good."
Aristotle advances the same argument in ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 994b 9 -15 (W.D. Ross,
trans.), in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: TE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION
1552, 1571 (Jonathan Barnes, ed., 1984):
"[T]hefinal cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something
else, but for whose sake everything else is, so that if there is to be a last term of this sort,
the process will not be infinite; but if there is no such term there will be no final cause. But
those who maintain the infinite series destroy the good without knowing it. Yet no one
would try to do anything if he were not going to come to a limit. Nor would there be reason
in the world: the reasonable man, at least, always acts for a purpose, and this is a limit, for
the end is a limit."
[Vol. 19
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good." Let us stipulate that fundamentality makes a good important, and
therefore makes it a plausible basis for the protection of human rights.
I deploy the "dispensability criterion." If you think something is good,
but would dispense with it if nothing of any value would ensue, then you
identify the dispensable thing as of instrumental value only. If you would
dispense with a thing if anything worthwhile it might lead to could be more
readily obtained without it, then you identify the dispensable thing as of
instrumental value only. If you would be reasonable in dispensing with it
under those circumstances, then you reasonably conclude that it is of
instrumental value only.
Many people believe that some human rights cannot be "dispensed
with": viz. overridden or even waived; and many human rights instruments
reflect this view. This suggests that some human rights are founded on
fundamental good.
A further distinction might be noticed: that between things which are
realistically dispensable and those whose dispensability can be discerned
only after an imaginative leap into a world quite different from the one we
inhabit. Your bicycle is obviously dispensable (you could walk or take a
taxi). Any and all means of locomotion can be anointed as dispensable
only if you take the leap, for example by supposing the availability of
"beaming up." Potatoes are obviously dispensable;food or nourishment is
dispensable only if you imagine humans to be pure spirits. We might call
the former goods "realistically dispensable" and the latter sort "only
hypothetically dispensable."' 4
A disinterested judge in a criminal proceeding is, for this sort of
reason, not realistically dispensable. You can, by a stretch of the
imagination, picture a judge who entirely disregards his own interests in
all cases, but to be realistic few are so pure. The same can be said of other
circumstances which tempt people to misconduct. (One might call them
occasions of wrongdoing."). The same can be said of the right of an
accused in a criminal proceeding to learn the charges and to confront
witnesses: that, and many other procedural devices aimed at ensuring a
fair trial, can be identified for similar reasons as not realistically
dispensable. To be sure, one might imagine a legal system in which judges
and prosecutors, though they refrained from informing suspects of what
was afoot, nevertheless reliably arrived at just decisions. Human nature
14. Plainly the same sort of good may be realistically dispensable at one time and place
but only hypothetically dispensable at another. When potatoes are the only nourishment
available in a country, they are, then and there, indispensable. Plainly also, the same sort
of good may be realistically dispensable for some people but only hypothetically
dispensable for others: insulin, for example.
2019]
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being what it is, however, consistently just results under those
circumstances are unlikely.
This Essay will employ a broadened definition of "fundamental good"
which makes it include instrumental goods whose dispensability is
hypothetical only: goods, such as food, which could not, realistically, be
dispensed with. Let us stipulate that "fundamental goods" in this extended
sense are important goods, and plausible candidates for the protection of
human rights.
If human rights are to be focused on things we humans do and
understand, as will be proposed in Part Two, then it seems that realistically
fundamental goods are more worthy of their protection than are goods
whose dispensability is only hypothetical.
Another key to the distinction between instrumental and fundamental
goods might be called the "dependency criterion." Instrumental goods
would cease to be good at all were final good to be removed. Instrumental
goods take their appropriate shape or character from the final goods
towards which they aim. (What time you leave for work and how fast you
walk depends on what your object is.).
II. Fundamental Good: Some Approaches Not Here Endorsed.
A. Pleasure.
Pleasure and the absence of pain has been one recurrent answer to the
question "what is final good?"' 5 Such an account is convincingly rebutted
by a famous "thought experiment" advanced by Robert Nozick in
Anarchy, State and Utopia:
"Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any
experience you desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could stimulate
your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel,
or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would
be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you
plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life's experiences?.
... Of course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll
15. Thus John Stuart Mill in Chapter II of UTILITARIANISM explicated "[t]he creed
which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle'...
• [It] holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the
absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM 9-10 (1861).
Pleasure-based theories have for the most part been varieties of utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism as one basis for rights among others is cautiously endorsed in JAMES W.
NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 58-61 (2d ed. 2007).
[Vol. 19
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think it's all actually happening. Others can also plug in to have the
experiences they want, so there's no need to stay unplugged to serve them.
... Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than how our
lives feel_. . ?",'
If you conclude, as most people do, that you would stay out of the
machine, that almost certainly is because you identify something other
than pleasure (or any other experience) as a dimension or kind of final
good. (A similar line of thought is taken by Aristotle when he observes
that "no one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout
his life, however much he were to be pleased at the things that children are
pleased at .... ).7
Another telling argument, to similar effect, is provided by Socrates, as
reported by Plato in the Philebus: 8
"Soc. Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the
enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?
Pro. [Protarchus] Certainly I should.
Soc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you
if you had perfect pleasure?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and
forethought,
and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?
Pro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.
Soc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the
greatest pleasures?
Pro. I should.
Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor
true
opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether
you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of
intelligence.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that
you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of
the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if
you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased
16. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-43 (1974) (emphasis in the
original)(hereinafter referred to as Nozick, Anarchy, State, state and Utopia.
17. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 13, at 1 174a 1-3 (elision in the text as
quoted; note omitted).
18 .PLATO, PHILEBUS (Benjamin Jowett, trans.),
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/philebus. 1b.txt.
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when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not
be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the
life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this
be otherwise?
Pro. No.
Soc. But is such a life eligible?
Pro. I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from
me the power of speech."
These passages establish that there is more to fundamental good than
pleasure.
There really can be no such thing as "pleasure alone." Neither pleasure
nor any other experience can exist without a being to experience it. Indeed,
pleasure and such-like experiences require, not any sort of being, but one
with the power to think, at least to the extent of receiving and grasping
experience. For Nozick's experience machine to work, the person in it has
to have a mind ("you will think it's all actually happening." 9). This
dimension is prior. Pleasure depends on it, would not arise without it, and
would disappear if it ceased to exist.
We may even reasonably surmise that pleasure takes its shape and
color from this other dimension of things, and is directed by it. You won't
greatly enjoy a child's pleasures once you grow up. Few of us continue to
watch Mr. Rogers or to play with toys.
All of this leads to the conclusion that pleasure, though it may be a
part of non-instrumental good, is at most a secondary part of it.
And similarly human rights ought not to find their foundation solely
in the protection of pleasure or the avoidance of pain.
Having conceded that, we are left looking for some other basis upon
which to condemn O'Brien for violating Winston's rights, as obviously he
did. We are also left looking for an explanation of why causing Winston
intense pain constituted a part of this offense. An explanation is set forth
in note 44, infra.
B. Respect; Honor; "Concern."
Another possibility is that the good for people consists in being
respected, or treated with respect, or regarded or treated with concern to
some substantial degree. This is suggested by many of the writings of
Ronald Dworkin, who made "equal concern and respect" central.2" Is
respect or concern the non-instrumental good, or a major part of it?
19. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, supra note 16, at 43 (emphasis added).
20. Dworkin wrote:
[Vol. 19
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Respect, honor, and concern are odd candidates because, unlike
pleasure, they are not attributes or conditions inhering in the person who's
good is at issue, but instead reside in the thoughts and doings of other
people. They are not, so to speak, inside the respected person. We
apprehend that whether or not a person's life or doings are basically good
depends mainly on what he himself is or does, and expect outside parties
to enter into the matter only insofar as they contribute or detract. Such is
not the case with respect, honor or concern. 21 Evidently there is something
relational about respect, honor, and concern, since they implicate the
connection between the person whose well-being is at issue and others -
perhaps even between him and his entire society.
A similar point might be made about human rights: their foundation
seems likely to lie within the person whose rights are in question, rather
than outside of him. (The orthodox approach view has been persuasively
characterized as holding human rights are things that people have "in
virtue of their humanity." 22).
Respect, honor, and concern are instrumental goods. This is shown by
the fact that when we consider whose respect, honor, and concern to seek,
we prefer people who know a lot about us, and people of good judgment.
(No one, as Aristotle observes, attributes importance to the admiration of
his dog.). This suggests that our desire for respect, honor, and concern is
shaped by some further purpose and that, as Aristotle observes, this further
aim is a sort of knowledge. We seek concern and respect in order to assure
ourselves that we have the virtues which elicit it.
23
"No government is legitimate which does not show equal concern for the fate of all those
citizens over whom it claims dominion. Equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political
community - without it government is only tyranny .... ".
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: TE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 1
(2000). Further:
"Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who
are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as human beings who are
capable of forming and acting upon intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
lived. Governments must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal
concern and respect."
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977).
21. Unless we take these terms to refer to self-respect and concern for oneself. Such is
certainly not Dworkin's intention, and will not be the subject of the present discussion.
22. John Tasioulas, On the Foundations of Human Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo,
eds., 2015).
23. An additional motive is suggested by the fact that we care more about the opinions
of those who can help or hurt us, less about the opinions of those who cannot. We would
dispense with caring much about the concern and respect which Joe displayed or possessed
if he ceased to be our boss.
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Consequently, we do not care much about the high opinion of someone
who hardly knows us; nor do we value respect, honor or concern of
someone with low or distorted standards. For example, we would not value
them if bestowed by a person who awarded them without regard to merit:
for example someone who bestows them "equally" upon everyone, as
Ronald Dworkin suggested: bestowed them regardless what a person is or
what he does. Still less would we value the respect, honor, and concern
bestowed by an exponent of a distorted or evil set of values. (In a society
which had descended into a condition of malice and degradation, a person
might, like Dietrich Bonhoeffer or Cardinal Stepinak, choose a way of life
which incurred disrespect.).
For these reasons, we must set aside respect, honor, and concern as
fundamental goods grounding human rights. (Doubtless the perennial
emphasis on them in writings on this subject reflects the likelihood that a
government which disrespects its subject, or some category of them, will
proceed to damage them in ways which do implicate fundamental good.).
C. Choices; Preference Satisfaction.
Another cluster of theories identifies the fundamental good as
constituted by choice; the exercise of choice; obtaining what has been
chosen; the satisfaction of preferences.24 Here is a central passage along
these lines in an important book by James Griffin:
"Human rights can ... be seen as protections of our human standing
or, as I shall put it, our personhood. And one can break down the notion of
personhood into clearer components by breaking down the notion of
agency. To be an agent, in the fullest sense of which we are capable, one
must (first) choose one's path through life - that is, not be dominated or
controlled by someone or something else (call it 'autonomy'). And
(second), one's choice must be real; one must have a certain minimum
education and information. And having chosen, one must then be able to
act; that is, one must have at least the minimum provision of resources and
capabilities that it takes (call all of this the 'minimum provision'). And
none of this is any good if someone then blocks one; so (third) others must
not forcibly stop one from pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile life
(call this 'liberty')."25
24. Thus John Harsanyi proposed that we "follow the economists in defining social
utility in terms of the preferences ... of the individual members of society. * * * [W]e
should help [other people] to obtain pleasure or to avoid pain ... or to achieve any other
objective, only as far as they want to achieve it." John Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism and
Decision Theory, 11 ERKENNTNIS 27-28 (1977).
25. ONHUMANRIGHTS 33 (2008). The elision reflects the omission of the word "then."
See generally GRIFFIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Roger Crisp, ed., 2014).
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Any theory in this cluster soon reaches out to encompass the
deliberations of the chooser: that is, the reasoning behind the choice. No
one, I suppose, would assert that the hasty, irrational, ignorant choice is
good, nor its unpleasant and unexpected consequences. No one can
reasonably insist that an ignorant choice to drive onto a collapsing bridge
is a part of the final good.26 Griffin implicitly rejects such possibilities and
introduces the element of informed, capable deliberation by insisting on
"education and information" and by his reference to "capabilities" in the
above-quoted passage. 27 Any reasonable theory along these lines must
insist that the subject possess and exercise the capacity to deliberate.
Furthermore, any such theory will require that the subject possess a
full complement of the character traits that conduce to the successful
exercise of choice and, further still, that he deploy those traits. A plausible
theory will require his successfully applying reason to the formulation and
to the implementation of the choice, rather than allowing his reasoned
conclusions to be overridden, for example by timidity or distraction or
anger. Thus, such a theory must stipulate that the person possess some
modicum, at least, of courage, and in addition a sufficient level of
temperance to overcome the suasions of appetite and passion.
For these reasons, a defensible choice-based theory must reach far
beyond choice, narrowly defined: it must recognize the good of many
important character traits as well, and of their exercise. A theory of this
sort is credible only as a component of a larger theory which comprises all
the attributes of character which support reasonable decision.28
26. The objection which is developed in the text is one of several well recognized
objections to preference utilitarianism. Here is another objection: the theory leaves us
ignorant about how to treat people who lack reasonableness or the ability to exercise it.
What about babies and the mentally incapacitated? Were preference utilitarianism the
entire story of ethics, and were it to be modified to refer only to choices or preferences
rationally developed, such people would be located in an ethical void; and were this ethic
the only basis for human rights, they would have none.
27. See also his reference to knowledge and information as important elements, at page
47, and his statement at page 150 that his account is based in major part on "autonomy," a
term which he defines to mean "self-decision [A] decision that results from one's
exercising one's capacity to distinguish true values from false, good reasons from bad...
ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 47 & 150 (2008)..
28. Might those character traits be identified as of instrumental importance only, by a
theorist determined to exclude them from fundamental good? No: for two reasons. First,
the dispensability criterion reveals that those character traits are not mere instruments for
the formulation of a persons' reasonable choices: blind luck will only occasionally result
in a good result, and if you gave yourself over to the control of some genie your choices
would be his not yours. Second, note that reason and other such capacities are not
"realistically dispensable" in the formulation of choice, and therefore would be part of
fundamental good even if they were merely instrumental.
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Another criticism is that an exclusively choice-based theory,
implausibly, can recognize no value in conditions which have not been
chosen, and none in activities which are not the product of the will. Such
a theory may attribute only a diminished value to a person to the extent he
accepts the guidance of culture and tradition, as many do in non-liberal
societies,29 and perhaps still less if he defers to the will of another. If, like
St. Paul, it is no longer I who live "but Christ who lives in me,"30 my value
seems to be the less as appraised according to the choice theory.
D. Needs Satisfaction.3 '
Another prominent theory found human rights on needs. Thus, David
Miller states: "[W]e prove that something is a human right by showing that
having that right fulfils the [basic] needs of the right-holder."32
A need is a requisite. A carpenter needs a hammer. An unemployed
person needs work. The term "need" relates to instrumental goods. (We
seldom say we "need" our reason or our reasonableness.) Therefore, an
exclusively needs-based theory recognizes value only in those things
which protect or satisfy instrumentalities. This suggests two lines of
criticism.
First: note that instrumental goods take their value entirely from the
final goods which they serve. A theory which accords value only to needs
omits to accord value to final ends. But surely if instruments are accorded
value, their final ends must be accorded value as well. Protecting or
satisfying needs cannot be the whole story. 33
Furthermore, within the area of instrumental goods, the strength of a
needs-based theory depends on the merits of the list of instrumental goods
to which it refers. (No credible theory will recognize a value in any
instrument; none in heroin, for example; none in racial epithets.). If the list
29. See David Miller, Personhood versus Human Needs as a Basis for Human Rights,
in GRIFFIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS 152, 157 (Roger Crisp, ed., 2014) (2007)(Griffin's
account "appears to deny that human beings can live perfectly good lives according to some
inherited pattern that they have not chosen for themselves, but simply take for granted.").
30. GALATIONS 2:20 (King James Version).
31. Further criticisms of theories based on needs are contained in ON HUMAN RIGHTS
88-90 (Roger Crisp, ed., 2014). t 88-90.
32. DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY And GLOBAL JUSTICE 179 (2007). See
David Miller, Grounding Human Rights, 15 CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 207 (2012).
33. It can, however, be part of the story: that is to say, a specific kind of right can be
founded on its satisfaction of a need for something instrumental to a final good of the sort
identified further on in this Article. A right to health and health care can, in major part, be
established on this basis, as is achieved in de Campos, Global Health, supra n. 2.
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is to be limited, as it must be, the strength of a needs-based theory depends
on the merits of the criteria by which it compiles the list.
Here are passages from David Miller's writings which address these
questions:
"[E]ach candidate list of human rights is assessed by how effectively
it will protect the conditions for a minimally decent life."34
"[T]here are certain key elements that are reiterated throughout
[human societies] .... There is no society in which human beings do not,
for example, participate in productive labor, raise families, play games,
sing and dance, engage in religious rituals, and so forth - or to be more
precise, no society in which they do not engage in these activities unless
prevented from doing so by coercion, by material deprivation or some such
cause. That allows us to speak of a human form of life .... [W]e can
understand the idea of human needs, as conditions that must be fulfilled if
people are to be able to live a human life at a minimally decent level.
Where their needs are met, they will have the opportunity to engage in
each of these core activities without having to forgo any of the others."35
General practice cannot be a satisfactory criterion, however.
Philosophy is not widely practiced. Bullying is.
E. Dignity.
Numerous international instruments found human rights on dignity, as
do a great many national and international judicial decisions.36 These
references gesture in a promising direction, because to appeal to human
dignity is to appeal to that which makes humans valuable. (Such is the
etymology of the term, which can be traced to "dignus," which means
34. David Miller, Personhood versus Human Needs as a Basis for Human Rights, in
GRIFFIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS 152, 161 (Roger Crisp ed., 2014).
35. Id. at 160.
36. In addition, the term is widely used in recent statements from the Catholic
magisterium. See, e.g., THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, SECTION 1930 (note
omitted) http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc-css/archive/catechism/p3 s lc2a3.htm:
"Respect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his dignity as a
creature. These rights are prior to society and must be recognized by it. They are the basis
of the moral legitimacy of every authority: by flouting them, or refusing to recognize them
in its positive legislation, a society undermines its own moral legitimacy. If it does not
respect them, authority can rely only on force or violence to obtain obedience from its
subjects. It is the Church's role to remind men of good will of these rights and to distinguish
them from unwarranted or false claims."
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"worth."). To identify "dignity" as a fundamental good is to appeal to
human worth.37
But what is that? Almost all non-skeptical theories appeal to one or
another account of human value; their divergences can almost always be
traced to disparities in their opinion of this subject.38
Some authorities seem to give "dignity" a limited meaning which
makes that good conflatable into one or another of the goods criticized
above: freedom from pain, for example, or choice and its exercise.
39
Theories of that sort can be rejected on two grounds. First, they
mischaracterize "dignity," which plainly may be enhanced rather than
diminished by pain, contempt, and many conditions (such as
imprisonment) which deprive the victim of liberty of choice. (Consider the
impressive set of narratives, recurrent throughout many cultures, which
extol the dignity of the suffering hero.). Second, they make dignity-based
ethics vulnerable to the same criticisms as those deployed against the
underlying good. If dignity means pleasure and freedom from pain, for
example, it cannot be the full final good for the reasons, set forth above,
which establish that pleasure and pain cannot ground final good. If dignity
means respect, it is vulnerable to the criticisms deployed above as to
respect-based theories.
Schopenhauer pungently stated:
"[The] expression 'Human Dignity', once it was uttered by Kant,
became the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For,
37. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK & RIGHTS (Meri Dan-Cohen, ed.,
2012); MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (2012). C( Kant's statement
in METAPHYSICS OF MORALS that a person's dignity is his "absolute inner worth":
"[M]an regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted
above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means
to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses
a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other
rational beings in the world."
IMMANUEL KANT, op. cit, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue, I, Part I,
Book 1, Chapter II (1797)(Mary Gregor trans., 1991, at 230)(a volume in Cambridge
University Press' "Texts in German Philosophy" series, Raymond Gues, General Editor).
Compare id, Part Two, Chapter I (page 255 in the Gregor translation):
"Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a means by any man
(either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end.
It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists .... ".
A more extensive discussion of dignity is present in Kant's earlier work, GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYICS OF MORALS (1785).
38. See generally HUMAN DIGNITY IN CONTEXT (Dieter Grimn, Alexandra Kemmerer
& ChristophMollers, eds., 2018).
39. See Thana de Campos, A4iD in Canada and the Homo Economicus View of
Dignity: Inclusive Enough?, 22 JOURNAL OF DISABILITY & RELIGION 246 (2018),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23312521.2018.1486775.
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behind that imposing formula they concealed their lack, not to say, of any
real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which was possessed of an
intelligible meaning .... "'
This is an exaggeration: "human dignity" does have an intelligible
meaning; as stated, it refers to human worth. The problem is that we are
left to inquire what it may be that is of value in humans and appeals to
human dignity do not imply even a sketchy answer.41 That accounts for
the unsatisfactory character of the term as a guide to human-rights ethics.
As a leading expert, Christopher McCrudden, writes:
"[T]he use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not
provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in
the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common
understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across
jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying
significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within
particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled
decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation,
increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its
significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides
a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of
human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just
coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances. 42
40. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE BASIS OF MORALITY 100 (1840; Arthur Brodrick
Bullock, trans., 1905).
Another telling recital of the confusions and contradictions arising based on appeals to
dignity is set forth in Paulo G. Carozza, "Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human
Experience," in UNDERSTANDING HuMAN DIGNITY 614, 619 (McCrudden, ed.,
2013)(hereinafter referred to as Understanding Human Dignity)(maintaining that although
there is a core meaning to the term, its "ambiguity ... [makes] the principal of human
dignity vulnerable to charges of inconsistency and even incoherence, and even to
ideological manipulation.").
41. But see Williams, Who Is My Neighbor?," supra note 4, especially at 146-64, where
the author proposes an account of human dignity which emphasizes the person's capacity
for choice and self-realization. It may be objected that an account of dignity based entire
on choice and the capacity to choose is vulnerable to the criticisms of choice-based theories
set forth above. It may further be objected that "self-realization" cannot be understood
without an account of what traits realize, rather than undermine, a person.
42. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights, 19 EUROPEAN J. INT'L. L. 655 (2008). This passage appears almost verbatim in
McCrudden' s "Acknowledgements" contribution to Understanding Human Dignity, supra
note 40 (at page xi): verbatim except that the passage is there preceded by the words "I
argued that" and except that some if the tenses have been changed from present to past and
the phrase "I suggested" has been interpolated. McCrudden does not, however, there
repudiate this conclusion.
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None of this requires, of course, that references to dignity be expunged
from basic documents or eschewed by judges and legislators. As Michael
Rosen writes: "Dignity is surprisingly deeply entrenched in our moral
discourse: it is not going anywhere any time soon."43 As Paulo Carozza
writes:
"The ontological claim of human dignity helps sustain the very
possibility of human rights as global principles that can and should help
us condition sovereignty and hold accountable those who abuse power,
especially the power of the state. Human dignity represents the ideal that
there is a certain unity to the human person in which conflicting claims of
rights need to be balanced and reconciled.... [W]ithout a commitment to
the idea of human dignity, human rights law as it has been painstakingly
constructed over the last seventy years would not exist."44
To recognize the dignity of each person is to acknowledge that there
are some universal human attributes or conditions which make a person
worthy of protection. " The trouble is that the term "dignity" takes us
almost nowhere in understanding what those attributes or conditions are.
Worse, the term may suggest arrogance: a puffed-up quality which leads
its possessors to disdain as "beneath their dignity" much that is basic to
the human condition. "Birth and breeding and death" are undignified.
(Therefore, science ought to find ways to replace them, according to the
recommendations of a villain in C.S. Lewis' novel That Hideous
Strength .46).
Owing to the term's indeterminacy, those who hear and rely on
propositions about dignity are easily misled into believing that they have
firmer bases for their conclusions than they actually possess.
III. Fundamental Good: The Approach Here Commended.
The best approach, as here maintained, identifies fundamental good as
the possession of a certain sort of character and the effective exercise of
43. Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in Understanding Human Dignity,
supra, note 40, at 143, 153 (2013),
44. Paulo G. Carozza, Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human Experience, in
Understanding Human Dignity, supra note 40, at 614, 620.
45. A valuable discussion of dignity as a basis for human rights is set forth in Donnelly,
Universal Human Rights, supra note 12, at 130-32 (noting at page 131 that "human dignity
is an intermediate concept that links human rights to 'comprehensive doctrines."').
46. C.S. LEWIS, THAT HIDEOUS STRENGTH: A MODERN FAIRY-TALE FOR GROWN-UPS
174 (Macmillan Paperback ed., 1967) (1945) ("What are the things that most offend the
dignity of man? Birth and breeding and death.").
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that character's abilities.47 (If that sounds too constricted - if "certain kind
of character" seems to imply a single model only - do not let that deter
you from reading on. The theory allows for variora, as will emerge.). It is
for the sake of these elements that we would stay out of the experience
machine. We would not choose to forfeit our minds -- our ability to
apprehend consider, grasp, and remember; nor to forfeit the use of our
minds in considering and contemplating and in reaching conclusions; nor
to lose the ability to conform our actions to our conclusions nor use of that
ability so as actually to act reasonably.
Character traits, or some of them, well survive application of the
dispensability criterion. To be sure, having a good character is
instrumentally helpful (it helps your career, for example). But we would
not dispense with it, though we had all the other goods. The same can be
said of the exercise of character traits and the achievement of their ends.
This, then, leads on to the question of what attributes are best, basic,
and central to being human.
A. Reason.
Let us take first, as a basic trait, reason: the abilities and qualities of
the mind which enable a person to think clearly and to arrive at the
attainment of knowledge .48
That reason is a fundamental good can be established using the
dispensability test. A clear, reason-pursuing, conclusion-grasping quality
of mind is something we would not dispense with. Such is the lesson of
the Nozick experience-machine narrative, the lesson of Aristotle's
reference to the "intellect of a child," and the lesson of Plato's reference
to the oyster orpulmo marinus (all quoted above). Losing one's mind, one
loses a significant part of oneself.
47. Compare S. Matthew Liao, Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good
Life, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 79 (Rowan Crft, S. Matthew
Liao & Massimo Renzo, eds., 2015)(proposing at page 81 that human rights protect the
"fundamental conditions" to a good life, and that a good life "is one spent in pursuing
certain valuable, basic activities." The present Essay is to similar effect as regards
activities, but identifies certain character traits as part of basic good - a more fundamental
part than activities, in fact. Matthew Liao makes character traits conditions to basic good,
since they are needed in order to pursue basic activities. So indeed they are; but many
character traits, notably those of the mind depicted below, are not only good as necessary
for something else - not only instrumentally good -but part of final good as well.).
48. See Rowan Cruft, Human Rights, Human Agency, andRespect: Extending Griffin 's
View, in GRIFFIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS 114, 115 (Roger Crisp, ed., 2014) (why not focus on
"our capacity for theoretical reason"?). (Cruft thanks Tom Pink for this suggestion.). Cruft
proceeds to set aside this suggestion on the apparent grounds that "rights language... is
most at home in characterizing the protection of agency." Id. at 116.
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That reason is basic may also be suggested by its involvement in the
other plausible goods described above. Respecting others involves
knowing them. Forming a preference requires the exercise of reason.
As promised, this Essay endorses the insight that reason, like other
qualities of character, has many dimensions and shows forth in different
ways in different cultures and among different individuals. Lincoln was
reasonable. Newton was reasonable. Samuel Johnson was reasonable.
Shelley was reasonable.
Human rights are violated when a person is deprived of reason. If
O'Brien and the Party drove Winston mad, as they probably did, they in
that way violated his human rights. 4
B. Reasoning.
Reason naturally leads on to reasoning; this Essay now proposes that
as a second fundamental good. Actually, to deploy reason for its obvious
purpose: to gaze insightfully, to think clearly, to grasp propositions, to
weigh evidence, to endorse conclusions, to draw inferences and apply
them -- these are projects fundamental to human life. Since speech and the
interior discourses are basic to reasoning, a component of this fundamental
good is the deployment of vocabulary and the formulation of coherent and
telling propositions.
Human rights are, therefore, violated by interventions which lastingly
and greatly impede clarity of thought. Such would be the effect, for
example, of a project which crippled a person's grasp or deployment of
language and speech.
The Party violated human rights by the imposition of Newspeak (as
described in the appendix to this Essay).
C. Knowing.
Reasoning naturally leads on to the acquisition of knowledge, which
is proposed here as a third fundamental good. Actually, to know: to
endorse insights, to sustain an understanding of things both particular and
general -- is good, as it is to retain knowledge and to employ it and reenact
it on what has been called the "stage of consciousness."
Knowing is not only an instrumental but also a fundamental good. One
could not reasonably dispense with knowledge, even under the unlikely
circumstance that all other goods could be achieved without it. To be sure,
many kinds of knowledge are instrumental to action and its achievements,
49. Pain intense and lasting enough to drive a person mad therefore violates his human
rights, as may pain which lastingly impairs his ability to exercise concentrated reason.
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but we would hold onto our knowledge even were this not the case. We
prize speculative insights, even those which have no practical
application.50
D. Benevolence and Love; Beneficence; Friendship and Loving.
A fourth cluster of fundamental goods enables a person to care about
others, to be benevolent towards them, and to love them. 51 Again, the
indispensability of these characteristics is evident. We would choose to be
kind and loving, "though he had all the other goods":5 2 quite apart, in other
words, from what further benefits might accrue to us.
Thus it would violate a person's human rights to deprive him of the
capacity to love, as perhaps the Party did to Winston and Julia.
Indeed, through its Hate Sessions, the Party may have sought the
comprehensive eradication of love. To have achieved this would have
violated everyone's human rights.
As with reason, so with beneficence and love: it is not enough to
possess the traits; one wishes actually to exercise them, to exercise them
effectively and to see them take effect. Like other good traits, these do not
come into their own so long as they remain bottled up.
50. An important objection might be that this analysis grounds no human rights for the
mentally handicapped, the senile or the demented, or for babies and very young children.
Of course, such persons may have human rights on other bases: they can love, for example.
But even as to the basis discussed in this text we can make ample ground human rights by
offering broadened definition of "reason" and "reasoning" according to which those terms
encompass experiential cognitivities: the acquisition of sensory data and their emotional
and aesthetic appreciation, for example.
51. Compare Williams, Who Is My Neighbor?, supra note 4, which frequently
identifies love as central: e.g. at 182 ("[L]ove - to be treated as an acting subject with a
transcendental purpose and never as a mere means - constitutes the content of the regard
due to human dignity. The fundamental right - the Ur-right, -- of the human person is the
right to be loved.") and at 302 ("The personalist approach affirms that every person ... has
a right to be loved."). These passages emphasize the right to receive love, or to be treated
as love requires; the present Article, in the text supra, instead identifies, as an ethical basis,
the good of the capacity to love and to act accordingly.
Perhaps Williams is right that love underlies all the ethical bases of rights. Certainly an
actor motivated by love for those affected will be guided by concern for their well-being,
As Williams says at page 320, "love of the person as such demands the affirmation of those
particular goods that contribute to and comprise the person's integral good." The great
question must then be what attributes and projects do comprise a person's integral good.
The present Article aims to supply answers to this question.
52. The phrase is from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1174a 1-3, supra n. 13.
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"A bell is no bell 'til you ring it,
A song is no song 'til you sing it,
And love in your heart
Wasn't put there to stay -
Love isn't love
'Til you give it away.1
53
Thus, it would violate a person's human rights to prevent him from
being friendly or loving.
E. The Ability to Conform One's Conduct to the Requirements of
Reason and Love.
A further fundamental good consists in the ability to conform one's
actions to the directives of reason and to pursue the goods commended by
benevolence and love. Intemperance, cowardice, and rage harm the
sufferer, not only by thwarting his success in the pursuit of instrumental
goods, but also by preventing his reason and benevolence and love from
fully taking effect. A man's actions are not fully his own when he is in the
grip of some such disorder. His deeper self is overwhelmed. He has been
broken.
Winston was broken. His final capitulation - his acknowledgement
that he loved Big Brother - reflects the Party's success in destroying
Winston's capacity to bring his reason to bear on the matter of whom to
love. In this respect also the Party violated his human rights.
F. National Citizenship; Social Membership
Being social animals, most of us humans are deeply embedded in
social orders, usually those of our nations. To live otherwise one must be,
as Aristotle said, "either a beast or a god.1
54
Citizenship and participation in the affairs of one's country is
instrumental to the possession and exercise of reason, beneficence, love,
and other basic goods. The civic order is a school for the development of
character and a field for its exercise. Perhaps it might be proposed that
53. RODGERS & HAMMERSTEIN, Sixteen Going on Seventeen, in THE SOUND of MUSIC
(1959).
54. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253 a 28-29 (Benjamin Jowett, trans.) in 2 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 2032 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). ("[H]e who is
unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be
either a beast or a god .... ".).
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these matters are of instrumental value, but they are not realistically
dispensable. One's citizenship and participation in one's country's affairs
cannot be forfeited without severe damage to the self, however meritorious
might be the foreign land to which one was exiled, and however warmly
one might be welcomed there.
Some of the provisions in international instruments which protect a
person's relationship with his country are justifiable on this basis.
PART TWO
I The Ethical Foundation.
Based on the above account of fundamental good, we can turn to the
definition of "human right" and place it on the following foundation: A
claim is well based on a human right if to deny it would substantially
interfere with a fundamental good.
So far as this takes us, the rights to one's reason - one's sanity - and
to using one's reason (thinking) and using it effectively (knowing) are
grounded on the ethical basis of human rights, as are the rights to one's
capacity to love and to act accordingly, and the rights to one's capacity to
conform one's actions effectively to the conclusions of reason and love.
An impairment of a fundamental good grounds a claim for the violation of
a human right.
Similarly, starvation - since as noted above fundamental goods
include not only non-instrumental goods but also those goods which
cannot realistically be dispensed with - has a good pedigree to be
identified as a violation of human rights.
II. Further Criteria.
Should we conclude, then, that any infringement of an important good
is a violation of human rights? This might lead to the protections across a
vast range. Lying to someone might, under this approach, violate his
human rights, as might interrupting him while he is reading, shutting down
his microphone at a meeting, and disturbing him while he was kissing his
girlfriend. Such conclusions are implausible.
It might seem that the objection comes down to cost: some actions,
though they infringe human rights, cannot be efficiently detected and
remedied. Understood this way, the problem is instrumental: if we could
"dispense with" cost we would protect these things as the human rights
violations they assuredly are. This is not the objection at issue here.
This Essay takes the more fundamental position that some
infringements of basic goods do not infringe human rights at all. To
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reiterate: it is here proposed that human rights, although their purpose is
to protect basic goods, are not ethically coextensive with the goods they
protect. Some fundamental goods do not merit human rights protection;
some impairments of fundamental goods do not infringe human rights.
A human right, it is here maintained, protects a fundamental good only
when it is suitable for social or legal recognition. This is so because
"human rights" is a social concept, and a good is eligible to be protected
as a human right only when it is eligible to be supported by meritorious
social practices.55
Human rights are instantiable within a decent society. This is not to
limit the field to rights that have already been agreed upon: this Essay, as
stated, is about ethics not convention. There may be many rights not yet
discerned. Nor is it intended to deny that any particular legal system may
reasonably identify as rights and extend legal protection to goods which
do not fit the bill. This is, however, to propose, as a necessary
characteristic of something's being ethically a human right, that it be
suitable for specification and invocation as a component of a social
institution and that it be such that a reasonable society might honor and
respect it. 56
This suggests the following requirements:
A human right must protect goods that can be attained or lost and
therefor might need protection. No one would propose a human right to be
lucky, or to be divine, or to be of noble descent.
A human right must protect goods which are in some important way
connected with humanitas. They are, after all, human rights. They should
protect goods which are rated as important by people generally. Some of
the appeal of human rights rests on the contribution they make, when they
are recognized and respected, to the good of human solidarity.
A human right must be invocable. It must be accessible to human
understanding: graspable, understandable, and communicable. Perhaps,
indeed, it must be expressible in ordinary language and comprehensible to
55. As Oran Doyle has pointed out to me, a right always involves two or more people,
whereas a value may involve only one.
56. Cf NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 186 (2d ed, 2007)(stating
that "[j]ustifying a right ... requires showing the availability of a feasible and morally
acceptable way of imposing duties and constructing institutions that will make it possible
to supply that good to all people.") This doctrine would, implausibly, would make
extraneous conditions abolish rights; bear in mind that for many centuries a majority of
people (never mind "all") could not have been supplied their basic rights by some outside
power by any means, that this may still be true today, and that these deplorable
circumstances could be spread yet more widely in some future age. The limitation proposed
in the present Essay speaks only to the intrinsic characteristic of a proposed right, not to
extrinsic conditions which might obstruct its implementation.
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ordinary people or at least to lawyers and judges. Human rights are not
arcane.
A human right must protect goods which are within the sphere of
society's concern. Goods that are entirely extra-civil - some people might
place the intimacies of friendship in that category - are unlikely subjects
for human rights.
A human right, must be stable: not altering with every breeze. A
human right, we apprehend, is invariant.
A human right must be determinable: clearly expressible rather than
incurably vague." Only if it has this character may claims based on the
right be adjudicable ('justiciable"), if not in court then in some social or
political forum. It must be appraisable in such a way that claims based on
it can be fairly assessed. The right to be "cared for" does not qualify, 8 nor
does the right to "enjoy his or her own culture."5 9 The widely asserted
rights to privacy and dignity may not qualify. A human right must to the
extent possible eschew matters of psychology and refer instead to external
phenomena.
The principle that human rights must be instantiable within a decent
society leads on to the question what makes for a decent society. All decent
societies comprise a morality of personal relations, including norms
pertinent to manners, civility, good taste, prudence, judgment, charity,
self-sacrifice, and the implications of relationships of intimacy and trust.
60
Human rights occupy but a portion of this field; indeed, they seem often
to jar with others (as within a family, for example, or a close friendship).
57. See JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 38 (2008) (a human right's "existence must
depend, to some extent, upon the concept's being determinate enough in sense to yield
human rights with enough content for them to be an effective, socially manageable claim
on others."). Butcf De Campos, Global Health, supra n. 2, at 43-44 (maintaining, that " [a}
relevant distinction cannot simply be dismissed, just because it is not always clear how it
applies in practical terms. Vagueness is a pervasive feature of language, and this also
applies to normative concepts. * ** [A]ny legal system has to operate withvague concepts
.... "). Accepting de Campos' points, the present article excludes only those proposed
bases for rights which are "incurably" vague: notably those which do not point in a
direction with sufficient specificity or clarity to guide determination.
58. A right to be "cared for by his parents" is expressed in Article 7(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3) ("The child shall be registered
immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.").
59. See id. at 14.
60. See generally KEITH THOMAS, IN PURSUIT OF CIVILITY: MANNERS AND
CIVILIZATION N EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (2018). We might suggest a principle of
normative compatibility, which would require that the theoretical structure underlying each
kind of norm be such as to generate norms which do not conflict with those of other types.
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One might apprehend that a society's over-indulgence in rights occludes
its liberality in endorsing other modes of social good.
This suggests a requirement of parsimony. Human rights, we
apprehend, are especially strong instances of moral norms, justifying
strong claims - demands -- and usually imposing strong obligations.
Therefore, we may surmise, they occupy a narrow space. If a good could
be thoroughly protected through principles of generosity, that
circumstance would suggest that the good is not ethically eligible to be
protected by a human right.6 ' The criterion of parsimony precludes finding
human rights under every bush.
The criterion of parsimony requires that an incursion on the protected
good be material before it amounts to a violation of a human right.
Interrupting someone who is reading or speaking or kissing his girlfriend
doubtless interferes with the exercise of a basic capacity and therefore
implicates fundamental good, but it does so in a small way, and cannot
reasonably be identified as a violation of human rights.62
An important element in materiality might be called "replaceability."
When the victim is deprived of a thing (an interval of uninterrupted time,
for example) which can be adequately compensated for by some other
thing (more time later), the deprivation is unlikely to be material. This
requirement is closely related to that of realistic indispensability set forth
above. When a thing's connection with final good is only instrumental,
and when it can (like turnips or bus rides) realistically be replaced by
something else (carrots or walking to work), that thing is "realistically
dispensable" and not a part of final good. This requirement ought to
exclude some of the elements mentioned on wish lists of human rights: for
example, the "right to inherit" expressed in the International Covenant on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.63
A further possible criterion is that human rights protect only those
goods which can in general be exercised by one person without wrongful
61. For example, a society may reasonably regard the education and training of children
as best protected by parents, and relegate human rights in this area to the protection of the
family unit.
62. Materiality in this context refers to the extent and depth of the good's involvement
in the basic attributes and their exercise, rather than to direct impact on other people.
Interruption of a presidential speech might be a big thing from the point of view of its
effects on partisan politics but might not be important from the point of view of the
president's character- his reason, for example, and its application. Contrariwise, depriving
Winston of his faculties of clear thought might not have been important in the larger
scheme of things - Winston was only a low-level bureaucrat, after all - but a major
infringement upon his deeper self. Here is a test: if the victim can reasonably attest, "I was
just not the same man or woman after that" - then the incursion was material.
63. Art.(V)(d)(vi), Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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harm to others. Nobody, one hopes, would propose a human right to kill
the innocent.
III. An Application of these Limitations: Love and Marriage.
What about Winston and Julia? Suppose we imagine that the Party had
not deprived either of them of sanity, or of the capacity to love someone,
but that it did - "only" -- destroy their relationship with one another.
The criterion of materiality leads us to inquire whether the deprivation
was or was not of something that could be replaced. Relationships differ
in this regard. Some, though it may not seem so when we are teenagers,
amount to little more than crushes, and though their endings are painful
they leave the parties no worse off. Others, such as marriages, are -
aspirational and, usually, actually as well - not substitutable. Winston and
Julia were not married, but neither were they teenagers with crushes on
one another. What ought we to conclude? Surely we must assess their
relationship as material. After its destruction, each of them would have
said, "I was never quite the same."
The requirement of determinability, however, excludes many such
relationships from the protection of human rights. The determinability
criterion requires that a good be clear and firm of outline (adjudicable;
justiciable) before its infringement can be accepted as a violation of a
human right. Romances, however intense, seldom satisfy this requirement.
Marriages, when they are defined, as they usually are, by social morality
and the commitments of the parties usually do qualify.
PART THREE: A FINAL WORD
The ethical basis of human rights is the protection and promotion of
humanitas.
APPENDIX
The Principles of Newspeak6 4
* ** The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of
expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of
Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended
that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak
forgotten, a heretical thought - that is, a thought diverging from the
principles of Ingsoc - should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as
thought is dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to
64. Orwell, 1984, supra note 8.
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give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party
member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other
meanings and also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods.
This was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by
eliminating undesirable words and by stripping such words as remained of
unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary meanings
whatever. To give a single example. The word FREE still existed in
Newspeak, but it could only be used in such statements as 'This dog is free
from lice' or 'This field is free from weeds'. It could not be used in its old
sense of 'politically free' or 'intellectually free' since political and
intellectual freedom no longer existed even as concepts, and were
therefore of necessity nameless. ... Newspeak was designed not to extend
but to DIMINISH the range of thought, and this purpose was indirectly
assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum.
"As we have already seen in the case of the word FREE, words which
had once borne a heretical meaning were sometimes retained for the sake
of convenience, but only with the undesirable meanings purged out of
them. Countless other words such as HONOUR, JUSTICE, MORALITY,
INTERNATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, SCIENCE, and RELIGION
had simply ceased to exist. A few blanket words covered them, and, in
covering them, abolished them. All words grouping themselves round the
concepts of liberty and equality, for instance, were contained in the single
word CRIMETHINK, while all words grouping themselves round the
concepts of objectivity and rationalism were contained in the single word
OLDTHINK. Greater precision would have been dangerous .... * * *
"So far as it could be contrived, everything that had or might have
political significance of any kind was fitted into the B vocabulary. The
name of every organization, or body of people, or doctrine, or country, or
institution, or public building, was invariably cut down into the familiar
shape; that is, a single easily pronounced word with the smallest number
of syllables that would preserve the original derivation. In the Ministry of
Truth, for example, the Records Department, in which Winston Smith
worked, was called RECDEP, the Fiction Department was called FICDEP,
and the Teleprogrammes Department was called TELEDEP, and so on.
This was not done solely with the object of saving time. Even in the early
decades of the twentieth century, telescoped words and phrases had been
one of the characteristic features of political language; and it had been
noticed that the tendency to use abbreviations of this kind was most
marked in totalitarian countries and totalitarian organizations. Examples
were such words as NAZI, GESTAPO, COMINTERN, 1NPRECORR,
AGITPROP. In the beginning the practice had been adopted as it were
instinctively, but in Newspeak it was used with a conscious purpose. It
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was perceived that in thus abbreviating a name one narrowed and subtly
altered its meaning, by cutting out most of the associations that would
otherwise cling to it. The words COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, for
instance, call up a composite picture of universal human brotherhood, red
flags, barricades, Karl Marx, and the Paris Commune. The word
COMINTERN, on the other hand, suggests merely a tightly-knit
organization and a well-defined body of doctrine. It refers to something
almost as easily recognized, and as limited in purpose, as a chair or a table.
COMINTERN is a word that can be uttered almost without taking thought,
whereas COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL is a phrase over which one
is obliged to linger at least momentarily. In the same way, the associations
called up by a word like MINITRUE are fewer and more controllable than
those called up by MINISTRY OF TRUTH. This accounted not only for
the habit of abbreviating whenever possible, but also for the almost
exaggerated care that was taken to make every word easily pronounceable.
"In Newspeak, euphony outweighed every consideration other than
exactitude of meaning. Regularity of grammar was always sacrificed to it
when it seemed necessary. And rightly so, since what was required, above
all for political purposes, was short clipped words of unmistakable
meaning which could be uttered rapidly and which roused the minimum
of echoes in the speaker's mind. The words of the B vocabulary even
gained in force from the fact that nearly all of them were very much alike.
Almost invariably these words - GOODTH1NK, MINIPAX,
PROLEFEED, SEXCRIME, JOYCAMP, 1NGSOC, BELLYFEEL,
TH1NKPOL, and countless others - were words of two or three syllables,
with the stress distributed equally between the first syllable and the last.
The use of them encouraged a gabbling style of speech, at once staccato
and monotonous. And this was exactly what was aimed at. The intention
was to make speech, and especially speech on any subject not
ideologically neutral, as nearly as possible independent of consciousness.
For the purposes of everyday life it was no doubt necessary, or sometimes
necessary, to reflect before speaking, but a Party member called upon to
make a political or ethical judgement should be able to spray forth the
correct opinions as automatically as a machine gun spraying forth bullets.
His training fitted him to do this, the language gave him an almost
foolproof instrument, and the texture of the words, with their harsh sound
and a certain willful ugliness which was in accord with the spirit of Ingsoc,
assisted the process still further.
"So did the fact of having very few words to choose from. Relative to
our own, the Newspeak vocabulary was tiny, and new ways of reducing it
were constantly being devised. Newspeak, indeed, differed from most all
other languages in that its vocabulary grew smaller instead of larger every
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year. Each reduction was a gain, since the smaller the area of choice, the
smaller the temptation to take thought. Ultimately it was hoped to make
articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain
centers at all. This aim was frankly admitted in the Newspeak word
DUCKSPEAK, meaning 'to quack like a duck'. Like various other words
in the B vocabulary, DUCKSPEAK was ambivalent in meaning. Provided
that the opinions which were quacked out were orthodox ones, it implied
nothing but praise, and when 'The Times' referred to one of the orators of
the Party as a DOUBLEPLUSGOOD DUCKSPEAKER it was paying a
warm and valued compliment."
